issues do not arise; they are no longer relevant. And some issues remain relevant but receive a different answer. The role of money is one such issue.
Second, I discuss some of the evidence I have gathered from my study --A History of the Federal Reserve --the work that has been my main occupation for the past four years. The two pieces are joined, as I hope to show. The evidence from history shows that the transmission process cannot be summarized by a single interest rate. In the final section, I present some econometric evidence to supplement the historical data.
Standard Models of Monetary Transmission
The core or central issue about the transmission of monetary policy is: How does a monetary impulse affect relative prices and real demands as it moves through the economy from its first appearance to its ultimate effect on the main determinants of economic welfare? The standard answer to this question is, now as for some considerable time in the past, that monetary injections change an interest rate in the money market. Because some prices, money wages, or anticipations do not adjust instantly, there are effects on output and employment that, though temporary, may be large and costly. Eventually, relative prices are restored, so the price level changes equi-proportionally. Money is neutral in the long-run. 1 Most of us accept large parts of this story. Real-business cycle theorists would both add and omit, as would other economists. Loan or credit market models make other changes. I shall not dwell on these qualifications, or the relevance of these analyses. Instead, I will use as illustrative a model that represents some of the best recent work on monetary policy to give specificity where it is needed.
2 Most of my comments apply more generally.
The class of models has two equations, aggregate demand and supply. Aggregate supply is a Phillips-type curve. Important for current purposes is that monetary policy is represented only by the interest rate in the aggregate demand function. An expansive monetary action lowers the nominal interest rate; a contractive action raises the nominal rate. The action is unanticipated, at least as to timing, so the real rate of interest changes with the nominal rate absolutely and relative to the anticipated real rate. In Svensson's (1998) model, that I have used as a good, clear example, aggregate demand is replaced by the output gap, and the aggregate supply function is adjusted accordingly. This difference is not consequential for my discussion.
The story about transmission embedded in this model is that a change in interest rates changes aggregate demand in the opposite direction. If the interest rate increases, output falls, the output gap increases, so inflation declines, raising the real rate of interest and continuing the process of mutual adjustment of aggregate demand and supply. When the target rate of inflation is reached, the central bank rests, and the economy adjusts to the new equilibrium.
The money stock and the demand for money remain in the background. The central bank sets the interest rate and provides the stock of money required to satisfy demand. The price level is determined with the rate of inflation and output, and so too is the demand for real money balances.
This stripped down model is useful for illustrating the interaction of aggregate demand and supply. As a model of monetary transmission, I believe it is deficient for two main reasons.
First, it has implications that are either misleading or wrong. Second, it omits significant parts of the adjustment of relative prices and real wealth to monetary and other shocks and the responses of aggregate demand and output to changes in relative prices and real wealth. These omissions are major parts of the transmission process.
Two False Implications
Many economists have used a model of this kind to discuss monetary policy in the 1930s depression and the long Japanese recession of the 1990s. In both cases, short-term nominal interest rates approached zero. The implication drawn from these experiences is that the monetary authority was powerless because the short-term interest rate was close to zero. The economy was said to be in a liquidity trap. For the Japanese case, see Krugman (1998) and Ito (1998) .
A liquidity trap is defined as a condition in which the demand for nominal money balances equals the stock of nominal balances at unchanged prices and interest rates, for all values of the nominal stock. Additions to the nominal stock cannot be transmitted to the real sector or the price level because the interest rate has reached a floor at or near zero.
As is customary in this class of models, assume that all assets are gross substitutes in portfolios. Ignoring transaction and information costs, it doesn't matter which asset the central bank buys or sells. Whichever asset it buys, the market adjusts the relative prices of all assets to reflect the change in relative supplies. This is a powerful and useful argument with strong implications. For example, economists use it to show that sterilized foreign exchange market intervention has no effect or to show why unsterilized exchange rate intervention differs from sterilized intervention.
Suppose, now, that with a short-term interest at zero, the Bank of Japan announces that it wants the dollar exchange rate to fall by 50% and that it is prepared to print yen to buy dollars until that occurs. Is there any doubt that the yen would depreciate or that the depreciation would affect spending, output and prices in Japan?
Suppose, instead, that the Bank of Japan makes no announcement but buys dollars with the intention of depreciating the yen by 50%. There may be differences in the timing of responses, but the ultimate effect would be the same: monetary expansion would affect the economy. There would be no liquidity trap whatever the short-term interest rate in the market in which the central bank usually operates.
Two questions occur. First, how can we reconcile our standard assumption of gross substitution with this obvious contradiction. Second, does this argument imply that a liquidity trap is impossible in a multi-asset world?
The liquidity trap, by assumption, makes short-term Treasury bills (or similar security) a perfect substitute for base money or bank reserves. Exchanging one for the other does nothing of interest. Exchanging either money or Treasury bills for some other asset such as foreign money, domestic or foreign long-term bonds, equities, or commodities changes relative prices and real wealth. In this hypothetical case, base money plus bills is a composite good. The composite good is a gross substitute for other assets; increasing either component, or both, is expansive.
For a full liquidity trap to be effective, the composite asset--money plus bills--must be a perfect substitute for all other assets. When the marginal rate of substitution of money for bonds goes to zero, all marginal rates of substitution must go to zero. 3 All assets are parts of a single composite good.
If assets other than bills and money remain gross substitutes, a liquidity trap means only that one row and one column in the matrix of marginal rates of substitution has been eliminated.
All other marginal rates of substitution remain. Monetary policy remains effective. The standard class of models gives the wrong answer about policy. It implies that a liquidity trap is possible and, for some, is a reality. Krugman (1988) , Ito (1988) . The alternative denies that a liquidity trap is possible except in the limit when all prices are zero.
A closely related proposition has received considerable attention as inflation rates have fallen and remained low in the 1990s. Summers (1991) revived the argument that a zero inflation target is socially costly because it sets a lower bound for nominal interest rates.
Monetary policy becomes weak or powerless; it cannot lower the short-term nominal rate or prevent falling prices from raising the real rate of interest. With money wages inflexible downward, unemployment rises. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) perform the remarkable feat of finding evidence for this proposition using data for a period in which inflation never remained close to zero. And Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (1998) argue that it is perilous to use a Taylor rule when inflation is near zero.
A more sophisticated version of Summers' argument uses a stochastic model with nonlinearity in the transmission process when inflation is below 2%. Orphanides and Wieland (1998) 
Historical Evidence
Each of the examples I consider concerns a period of deflation. Prices fell raising real interest rates through most or all of the recession. Expansive fiscal actions in each episode were either modest or absent. Two of the recessions are considered severe according to rankings by the National Bureau of Economic Research. In each case the economy recovered, and two of the three recessions were of average length.
The common feature that is relevant for the monetary transmission process is that real money balances and real interest rates rose together. In each case there was a common cause:
prices fell. In some cases gold inflows or Federal Reserve actions increased the monetary base;
in other cases, the monetary authorities were passive or restrictive through most or all of the recession. Differences of this kind are of secondary importance in the three examples (but not in the great depression). The dominant, common impulse in the three examples was deflation.
Two of the three episodes share a second relevant feature; the interest rate on short-term Treasury bills was historically low. During the 1948-49 recession, rates on Treasury bills were about 1%. In 1937-38, bill rates were close to zero. In the third case, 1920-21, short-term rates remained well above zero, but the deflation was sharp and severe, so real interest rates and real money balances rose together.
1937-38
The National Bureau ranks the 1937-38 recession as the third most severe recession in the years after World War I. Real GNP fell 18% and industrial production 32% in the thirteen During the entire period December 1936 to December 1938 that brackets the recession, interest rates on Treasury bills remained between 0.03% and 0.56%. Long-term nominal rates on Treasury bonds were modestly higher during the recession than before or after, but the difference is small; the range is 2.55% to 2.83%.
Annualized monthly rates of price change are consistently negative from October 1937 to 
1948-49
The 1948 Real base growth fell to -11% in September 1948, two months before the cyclical peak.
Thereafter base growth rose, but did not become positive until April 1949, six months before the trough. The peak rate of base growth is close to 6% in August 1949, two months before the end of the recession. At that time the real long-term interest rate was above 5%.
Once again, the movement of real base growth is consistent with the beginning and end of recession; the movement of real interest rates is not. Once again, low nominal short-term interest rates do not appear to have weakened the effects of monetary policy. And once again there appears to be more to the transmission process than is contained in standard models.
1920-21
The third episode is the recession from January 1920 to July 1921. Chart 3 shows these data. The long-term nominal rate remains within a narrow range but is higher at the trough of the recession than at the previous peak. The dominant influence on real rates and real base growth during the recession is the decline in inflation followed by deflation.
Insert Chart 3 here
As in the previous two episodes, interest rates give a misleading signal about the thrust of policy. Real base growth gives a more correct signal. In this recession, the deflation is severe; the peak annualized rate reached 17%, and it was above 10% for ten consecutive months. The real long-term interest rate, (i-π)/(1+π), is above 25% at the end of the recession. The economy recovered despite, not because of, the level of real interest rates.
The three historical periods raise doubts about the central role assigned to interest rates in the transmission process. They suggest an important role for real balances. I return to these issues below.
The Great Depression
The only other period of U.S. deflation after 1914 is during 1929 to 1933, the great depression. The real interest rate rose from 5% to 15% and remained near 15% through the last two years of the recession. Real base growth rose once bank runs began late in 1930, but this is, of course, misleading. As Chart 4 shows, growth of real balances--measured here by M 1 --is very different in this period than in other deflationary periods. A principal difference is that monetary contraction was strong enough to offset the effects of deflation on real balances.
Chart 4 here

An Additional Problem
Although the central bank's objective function is not directly part of the transmission process, the three U.S. recessions considered here raise doubts about the choice of objective function used in current analyses. The usual function has two arguments: (1) the difference between the inflation target and the actual or expected inflation rate and (2) suggests that the problem can be overcome by redefining the natural rate to take account of nonmonetary effects. In principle, this can be done; in practice it is difficult to do accurately.
The natural rate is not like the gravity constant. We neither measure it precisely nor agree on its value. Opening the objective function to the pull and tug of opinions about the size of the gap carries a risk to economic stability and the apolitical position of an independent central bank. Recent discussion in Europe and the United States shows that there can be differences of opinion about measurement of both potential output and the natural rate of unemployment.
A second problem with the now standard objective function is that it neglects several issues of concern to central bankers. There is no role for a lender of last resort. A run to currency, bank failures, a drain of foreign exchange reserves, a major change in the exchange rate, or a so-called credit crunch enters the bank's objective function only by changing the output gap or inflation. This misstates what central banks do. Properly functioning central banks respond to the increased demand for money before output and prices fall.
Officials of the new European Central Bank emphasize that inflation is their sole
objective. Their insistence on this point does not, and should not, preclude concern for the cost of achieving the zero or target rate of inflation. This cost should appear in the objective function, so that the objective is not just to achieve zero inflation but to do so at minimum social cost.
With cost replacing the output gap in the objective function, the way is open to treat other issues of concern. The implicit cost function used by central banks includes costs of maintaining or restoring financial safety or solvency, avoiding a credit crunch, or increasing unemployment.
In practice, even central banks most concerned about inflation do not ignore the social cost of reducing inflation. They proceed gradually, over a period of months or years. And they,
properly, do not ignore financial fragility, financial failures, and lender of last resort responsibilities when making decisions. In fact, the opposite seems to be true; some central 
Econometric Evidence and Interpretation
The three historical episodes discussed earlier suggest that an interest rate does not fully Brunner and Meltzer (1963, 1968) . On either interpretation, we lose the simplicity of the two equation, aggregate demand-aggregate supply, class of models. If real balances affect aggregate demand, the demand for money and perhaps other parts of the financial structure become relevant for the transmission process. The single interest rate is no longer sufficient to represent monetary policy and financial markets.
Let me turn the issue around. The requirements of the standard model are strong and are, as we have seen, easily falsified empirically using historical episodes. Analytically, the model is very demanding. Not only must the wealth effect remain small and inconsequential for spending, but a single interest rate must represent all relative price adjustment.
An appeal to rational expectations puts additional burdens on credibility. Market makers and participants must rationally anticipate how much output prices will change to restore equilibrium at the natural rate. One data point, one observation on the interest rate, is not sufficient to determine whether the change is permanent or temporary, a change in level or in growth rate, or an error that will be reversed. Even if one believes that adjustment is rapid in markets for actively traded assets, many assets are traded infrequently or not at all.
The transmission of monetary policy involves adjustment of prices of existing hotels to newly produced hotels, existing plants and equipment to newly constructed plants and equipment, new cars to used cars, new houses to existing houses, and, of course, money wages to prices I do not propose adding equations for each of these variables. That would take us toward large-scale econometric models, a technology that has not contributed greatly to our understanding of monetary policy. But there is also considerable evidence that the expectations theory of the term structure or interest arbitrage theories of the exchange rate are far from adequate. This latter evidence suggests, again, that a single interest rate does not summarize adequately responses in asset and output markets.
Recent analyses of the credit channel exploit differences in information to develop an additional transmission channel for monetary actions. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) . The credit channel operates parallel to the interest rate (or monetary) channel, and the two interact.
Empirical support for this channel has not been persuasive; the hypothesized effect is probably swamped by the endogenous response of bank loans to the monetary base and other determinants of aggregate demand. The use of costly information to separate parts of the transmission process is a step forward, however. It may find a better use distinguishing markets for bonds and real capital or distinguishing different types of capital.
How well do real money balances capture the many channels of monetary transmission? Koenig (1990) Koenig finds evidence of a relatively strong real balance effect. A 10% change in real balances, ceteris paribus, results in a 2-1/2 to 3% change in spending on consumption. This result is in addition to any effect of real balances on the real interest rate and, thus, indirectly on consumption. Koenig found the latter effect relatively small, however. He used a short-term interest rate.
In the three historical episodes discussed earlier, real balances rose in each recession. In two of the recessions, the increase was more than 13.5% from peak to trough. In 1948-49, the increase was less than 1% from peak to trough but 3 to 4 times larger if measured one month before the trough. If Koenig's estimates apply to these out of sample cycles, they imply a 3-1/2 to 4% increase in consumption spending in the two earlier recessions. This result is economically meaningful.
To test this hypothesis, I attempted first to replicate Koenig's results. Then I extended his sample period by 30%, an addition of 42 quarterly observations. Most of the attempts at replication supported his hypothesis; in fact, the only important change strengthens his findings.
Koenig presents several different two stage least square estimates. I was able to replicate many of his findings. Table 1 reports only a small part of the results, but many of the results are of interest principally because the main results are robust to changes in the arguments included in the estimation. All results are two stage least squares estimates.
6 Definition of variables is in Koenig (1990, pp. 422-24) We have used his definitions wherever possible, but we are uncertain about his measurement of interest rates--end of quarter, quarterly average, etc. Interest rates are after tax rates, where tax rates are marginal rates from Barro and Sahasakul (1983) . We assumed constant marginal rates after 1980. 
Conclusion
Viewed one way, the point of this paper is an old one, one that is well-known as the Pigon-Haberler-Patinkin real wealth effect. The conclusion in that case would be that the wealth effect is more relevant in a dynamic context than current, standard analysis recognizes.
An alternative interpretation is that the dynamic real wealth effect includes more than the direct effect of changes in real money balances. If anticipated returns and anticipated inflation affect prices of assets with low transaction costs more rapidly than the prices of new production, many changes in relative prices of assets to output are part of the transmission process. As home prices change relative to foreign prices, the real exchange rate changes. This change is supplemented by a change in the nominal exchange rate in a fluctuating rate regime.
The standard model includes a type of Phillips curve, so prices do not adjust instantly to changes in money. Hence real balances change cyclically. The consumption equation in the text suggests that the effects of monetary change are not fully expressed by a change in a single short-term interest rate. A recent study of forecast performance in Germany suggests that this finding is not limited to the United States. Kirchgassner and Savioz (1998) .
Rather than rely on a single regression equation, I have used data from periods of deflation to show that changes in real interest rates cannot explain some major episodes in monetary history. In 1920-21, nominal interest rates were higher at the trough than at the preceding peak. Prices fell sharply, so real interest rates were higher still. Postwar fiscal policy was contractive.
Why did the economy recover? Falling prices raised existing real wealth and increased the gold flow to the United States. Real money balances rose rapidly. The same process worked to end the 1937-38 recession and, more modestly, the 1948-49 recession. Even in the 1929-33 depression, real balances played a role. This time, the money stock fell in most periods by more than the price level, so the real wealth effect did not sustain expansion.
Evidence from periods of deflation is useful because deflation raises both real interest rates and real money balances. Change in interest rates and money have different implications; one points to expansion and an end to recession, the other to continued, possibly deeper Benhabib, J., Smith-Grohe, S., and Uribe, M., (1998 
